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The aim of this article is to emphasize the main features of the Plea Agreement 
procedure in the European traditional systems, common law and civil law, as well as the 
features of this concept as it has been implemented into the proceedings of some European 
countries and, accordingly, to analyse the reasons for which, the expertise of these already 
implemented procedures might be a pathway to solve many shortcomings of the national 
jurisdictions. 
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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The Plea Agreement is a criminal proceeding arising from the Anglo - American 
judiciaries and consists in the fact that both the prosecutor and the Defense, taking into 
account the specific circumstances of the case, reach a mutually beneficial agreement. 
According to this agreement, the defendant accepts a self-incrimination while the prosecutor 
ensures a more convenient penalty than that the defendant would expect, if found guilty at the 
final judgment. Subsequently, this agreement must be approved by the court, thus relieving 
the judicial authorities to conducting adjudicative judgment according to the classical 
procedure. In such proceedings, in exchange for the defendant’s admission of the alleged 
facts, depending on the jurisdiction to which we refer, the prosecutor have some different 
bargaining tools: he may waive some charges in exchange for the defendant’s admission of 
committing others; he may offer a reduced penalty; he may offer lighter modes or less 
coercive forms of penalty enforcement; he can guarantee a range of benefits within the 
witness protection programs in exchange of the defendant’s self incrimination and further 
cooperation for the prosecution of other criminals. 
It is not completely random why this special procedure appeared in the criminal 
jurisprudence of the Common Law states, also known as the adversarial judicial systems. 
Here, the State, represented by the prosecutor, is only a part within the criminal process, 
sharing exactly the same statute like the defendant and the pattern of the process appears to be 
very similar to that of a civil process. In addition to this aspect, the adversarial systems 
traditionally provided significant procedural rights and safeguards for defendant while the 
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State did not employ professional criminal investigators until to a later stage
1
. So being, the 
evidentiary activity of the State representative was quite often difficult. In addition to that, 
unlike in the inquisitorial systems of the civil law countries (known also like the European 
continental countries) where the professional judges render the verdicts, in the adversarial 
systems they are traditionally done by a jury, whose predictability in decisions is extremely 
low. Given these circumstances, the need for compromise came naturally from the both 
parties, each of them trying to avoid a risk of an absolutely unfavourable decision rendered by 
the jury. 
Plea Agreement procedures have not only evolved over the time in the Anglo-
American systems in as much as to become a common practice, especially in specific fields 
like organized crimes or corporate crimes, but due to the fact they significantly relieve the 
workload of the judicial bodies, began to be more and more attractive for the civil law 
systems applied in the European continental countries. In the past time, the latest systems 
were characterized by a clear disproportion between the Prosecutor and the Defense arms and 
also governed by the ubiquitous principle of mandatory prosecution
2
. So being, until not 
many years ago, they neither created concern for Prosecutor nor provided a legal possibility 
for negotiation with the defendant. 
During the last decades of the twentieth century, the situation had been gradually 
changed when the majority of the European countries have amended the procedures in the aim 
of rebalancing the disproportion of the arms between the Prosecutor and the Defense by 
loaning some legal instruments from the adversarial systems. The fact many European states 
became members of the Council of Europe in the latest decades of the twentieth century and 
accordingly the effect of the European Convention for Human Rights on the national criminal 
legislations of those countries has determined, also, some significant changes in the sense of 
ensuring effective rights and safeguards for defendant during the criminal process and even of 
recommending a lenient conviction for the defendant who admit the facts as result of 
cooperation with the judicial bodies All the above mentioned circumstances have created a 
room for negotiating: firstly, because the increasing rights and safeguards of the defendant 
entailed a more and more difficult evidentiary activity for the Prosecutor, and secondly, 
because the increased Prosecutors’ workload made the means of alternative resolution of the 
criminal cases more attractive than ever. 
2. CONTRASTING FEATURES OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CONTINENTAL MODELS 
Despite the fact most Anglo-American judicial systems don’t use the same patterns of 
negotiated justice we can say that some common characteristics thereof distinguish them from 
those adopted in the European continental countries. These differences show us a pervasive 
presence of the negotiated justice in almost all kind of criminal cases and greater bargaining 
tools for the prosecutor in Anglo-American systems while a remaining reluctance in accepting 
the negotiation with the defendant in the European continental countries. 
                                                          
1 See, G. Fisher, “Plea Bargaining’s Triumph”, Yale Law Journal (YLJ) 109, (2000), pp. 857-897  
2
 See, for example, the German Code of Criminal Procedure, Section no. 152, paragraph (2): “Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the public prosecution office shall be obliged to take action in the case of all criminal 
offenses which may be prosecuted, provided there are sufficient factual indications”, available on 
http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/3235/file/Germany_CC_1971_amended_2009_en.pdf 
THE PLEA AGREEMENT – A NEW WAY OF NEGOTIATED JUSTICE IN THE 
EUROPEAN JUDICIARIES 
68 
The first different aspect is that related to the character of the defendant’s act of self-
incrimination. While in the Anglo-American countries this is deemed as a defendant’s failure 
to invoke his/her affirmative defence or to raise his/her arguments in fighting the charges in 
exchange for the concessions offered by the prosecutor, in the Continental pattern, it supposes 
an in-court confession of the defendant. Thus, the Anglo-American agreement is deemed as a 
quasi-contract and the other like an informal gentlemen’s agreement3. The aspect is not almost 
irrelevant because, while in the Anglo-American systems, the plea agreement is able to avoid 
a trial, the Continental pattern is only able to shorten the trial. 
Another aspect is that of the field of application of this concept because within the 
Anglo-American systems there is no restriction of negotiated justice for all kind of crimes, 
regardless their gravity, while most of the Continental legislators still don’t allow negotiations 
with the defendants who commit the gravest crimes. Moreover, if the former systems allow 
the negotiations to affect even the charges, in the sense of their alteration or partial 
elimination, the latest systems accept only some lenient penalties or less coercive ways of 
penalty enforcement to be negotiated with the defendant
4
. 
When analysing the bargaining tools of the Prosecutor, we can see more potential of 
the Anglo-American prosecutor given by the system of formal qualification of the crimes in 
the Common Law countries. It creates the possibility to charge the defendant with many 
crimes for one single committed fact and, accordingly, to burden the defendant with a severe 
final sentence due to the system of arithmetic aggregation of the penalties issued for each 
charge. So being, the threat of a severe sentence for defendant makes a certain magnitude for 
the concession offered by the Prosecutor and even a greater availability toward negotiations 
for defendant. On the contrary, in the civil law countries, where the system of arithmetic 
aggregation of the penalties is not allowed and sentencing the defendant for many charges 
means, often, the penalty issued for the gravest charge and possibly an increase of it (taking in 
account the number and the gravity of the other charges), the room for negotiations is not very 
large. In addition to it, the prosecutor cannot waive charges and even more the gravest charge 
which attracts the most severe penalty.     
Even though within the both systems, the court is required to approve the agreement 
between the prosecutor and the defendant, the involvement of the judge is different
5
. Within 
the Anglo-American version, it doesn’t need any implication of the judge in the transaction 
and, accordingly, it doesn’t entail any obligation excepting that of assessing the legality and 
proportionality of the agreement, while the judge in the Continental systems, once the 
agreement has been approved and accepted the in-court confession of the defendant, as a 
commitment arising from the deal, is bound to issue a reduced sentence according to the 
relevant law provision.   
A final observation is on how much reliable are these agreements in these two 
systems, from the perspective of the defendant. While both judges are free to disregard the 
agreement, the problem is what will be the risk faced by the defendant if it even happens? As 
in the Anglo-American systems the agreement is deemed as a quasi–contract, if the prosecutor 
renounces on the deal or the judges disapproves of it, then the defendant will be free of 
                                                          
3
 See, M. Damaška, ‘Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts’, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (JICJ), 2 (2004), Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 1027. 
4
 Ibidem, 1025 
5
 Ibidem, 1026 
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revoking the plea. Consequently, the trial is going to proceed without any harm for defendant. 
Unlike, in the civil law countries, the plea agreement means an in-court confession and 
therefore, if the Prosecutor waives the deal or the judge disapproves it, the confession will 
remain valid and, very possible, a harsher than negotiated sentence will burden the 
defendant
6
. Then, it is quite clear that the Anglo-American pattern is much more reliable than 
that of the civil law countries because in the former system, in the case of the agreement's 
breakdown, the out of court self-incrimination of the defendant does not affect its rights and 
safeguards during the trial. 
Taking in consideration the above mentioned differences, plus other less significant, 
of the concept of plea agreement in these two judicial systems, we can conclude the Anglo-
American model is better developed, widely practiced in all kind of criminal cases, offers a 
greater potential in negotiations for the Prosecutor and is, also, more reliable for the 
defendant. Moreover, the mutual concessions of the parties do not entail any involvement and 
obligation for the judge, thus not affecting his/her neutrality. Thus, the perspective of the 
agreement’s failure does not affect the defendant rights and safeguards during the trial due to 
the followings: the out of court self-incrimination can be revoked; it has no any evidentiary 
weight in the trial; it is not known by the jury; the judge remains neutral in relation to the 
agreement.  
In the Continental systems, plea agreement is just a pioneering procedure, allowed 
only in the cases dealing with less grave offences, without prejudice to the charges, and 
involving an in-court confession which remains valid evidence, even when the agreement is 
violated by the prosecutor or disapproved by the judge.    
However, despite of the features showing it as a better model in achieving an 
alternative resolution of the criminal cases, the Anglo-American plea agreement is not far 
away from criticism. The first is related to the asymmetrical position of the negotiating parts, 
that is, the severity of the threatened penalties as well as the greater informational and 
financial possibilities of the Prosecutor during the trial and even the psychological imbalance 
between the parties, might lead to some undesirable situations in which, even some innocent 
defendants would prefer an agreement with the prosecutor instead of an unpredictable verdict 
at the end of the trial
7
. This tactic of the prosecutor deliberately exaggerating the number and 
the gravity of the charges in order to create a larger room for negotiations entails a lot of 
criticism especially in U.S.A.. In order to prohibit such practice in U.K., the Code for the 
Crown Prosecutors, explicitly provides some rules in this respect
8
.  
                                                          
6
 Ibidem, 1027 
7
 See M. Yant ‘Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted’ (1991), Prometheus Books, 
New York, p. 172 
8 See, Code for the Crown Prosecutors, Selection of charges:  
6.1 Prosecutors should select charges which: a. reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending supported by 
the evidence; b. give the court adequate powers to sentence and impose appropriate post-conviction orders; c. 
enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way. 
6.2 This means that prosecutors may not always choose or continue with the most serious charge where there is 
a choice. 
6.3 Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just to encourage a defendant to 
plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage 
a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one. 
6.4 Prosecutors should not change the charge simply because of the decision made by the court or the defendant 
about where the case will be heard. 
6.5 Prosecutors must take account of any relevant change in circumstances as the case progresses after charge. 
Available on http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/charges.html 
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Some other specialists criticize this marked -oriented approach of the plea agreement 
because it means an inter-party arrangement whose outcome might negatively affect the 
interest of the victims and of the general public in what regarding the transparency of criminal 
justice
9
. The lenient penalties offered by the prosecutor might, also, create a public sense of 
injustice. No less important is the discretionary power of initiating and concluding agreements 
of the prosecutor which might lead to an unequal treatment for those defendants for whom, 
the prosecutor doesn’t have any interest in concluding an agreement with.   
Finally, the power to negotiate justice and the bargaining tools to the prosecutor’s 
disposal raise a problematic issue of its role in the administration of criminal justice. In the 
Common Law jurisdictions, the judge is traditionally deemed as the best positioned in 
achieving the public interest in criminal matters. However, the out of court inter-party 
agreements which exclude the judge from attributing criminal responsibility and imposing 
penalties and the increased case-law of this procedure show a shift of the Prosecutor into the 
most important decision-maker and also make questionable this traditional role of the judge in 
doing justice in criminal matters
10
.  
Undoubtedly, the above mentioned are not necessarily systemic weaknesses of the 
plea agreement procedure in the Anglo-American systems but rather found on a case by case 
basis, however, the fact there are several opinions of the experts depicting these weaknesses, 
demonstrates this procedure is not infallible but rather can elicit improvements.  
3. PLEA AGREEMENT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CIVIL LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 
As said in the above chapters, while the Anglo-American systems have already 
developed a solid and thorough practice in applying the Plea Agreement procedure, especially 
in U.S.A.
11
 where the greatest majority of the cases are solved in this way, in the European 
Continental countries, the practice shows us a remaining reluctance for implementing it in 
many countries as well as some problematic issues in the countries where Plea Agreement has 
been adopted. In this chapter we propose a brief comparative analysis of these issues and have 
chosen seven representative countries but not only that adopted or accepted Plea Agreements 
within their jurisprudence from each European Continental category, that is, France, Italy and 
Germany from the group of the West European countries, Poland and Romania from the 
Central and East European countries, Estonia and Georgia belonging to the group of the ex-
soviet countries.  
3.1 France  
In France, the Plea Agreement with the name La comparution sur reconnaissance 
préalable de culpabilité (CRPC), also called plaider coupable has been introduced in the 
French Criminal Procedure Code by the so called "Perben Act II" of 9 March 2004, which 
was designed to adapt the French criminal justice to the evolution of criminality. The plea-
bargaining procedure, previewed within Articles 495-7, 495-16 and 520-1 of the French 
Criminal Procedure Code is a new response to those situations in which, according to the 
concrete circumstances and the spirit of the criminal legislation, a fully adjudicative trial can 
                                                          
9 See, M. Damaška, supra note 3, p. 1028 
10
 See, F. Tulkens, ’Negotiated Justice’, in M. Delmas-Marty, J.R. Spenser, European Criminal Procedures, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2002), p. 74 
11
 See, A. Alschuler, W. ‘Plea Bargaining and Its History’ in Colombia Law Review 79 (1), (1979) pp. 1–43 
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be avoided. According to the above-mentioned articles, the prosecutor could make a deal with 
the defendant who is suspect of committing some relatively minor crimes
12
 by proposing a 
penalty not exceeding one year in prison in turn for the defendant’s guilty plea. Once 
concluded, the deal is a subject of the approval of the president of the tribunal de grande 
instance (High Court) or of another judge appointed for the former. According to the 
provisions of the Article 495-11, the defendant, assisted by his/her attorney, after concluding 
the agreement with the prosecutor, has to do an in-court confession of his guilt. The judge, 
according to the concrete situation and taking in account the supporting evidence of the case, 
can render an ordinance of confirming the penalty proposed by the prosecutor which has the 
power of a final sentence. The judge’s ordinance must be enforced immediately after its 
pronouncement.     
This new procedure is not very well viewed by the French practitioners. Most of them 
consider it as creating the premises for the violation of defendants’ rights and safeguards 
because it gives too much power to the prosecutor and would encourage defendants to accept 
a sentence only in order to avoid the risk of a more severe sentence in a trial, even if they did 
not really deserve it. A relevant proof of its lack of popularity in France is the statistic of 
criminal cases in 2011
13
 which shows 77,569 criminal cases out of 513,911, representing only 
15,09% of the decisions rendered by the correctional courts, were concluded following a Plea 
Agreement.  
3.2 Italy 
 Italy was a pioneer of the European Continental countries implementing the Plea 
Agreement, called patteggiamento
14
, as it is known among the Italian provisions of criminal 
procedure since 16 February 1987 when the Article 45 point 2 of the Law no. 81, enabling 
legislative delegation to the Government of the Republic for promulgation of the new Code of 
Criminal Procedure entered into force and as it was reshaped in the Article 444 of the Italian 
Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Law no. 134 of June 12 2003. Summarizing 
its content, we can see an opportunity for the defendant to conclude an agreement with the 
prosecutor when he/she deems that the punishment that would, concretely, be handed down is 
less than five years imprisonment. In turn for his/her guilty plea, the prosecutor may offer a 
reduced sentence, an exempt from the payment of the proceeding’s fees, a drop of some 
charges or a change of them with other less severe. Basically, the Italian bargaining is not 
about the charges but about the sentence in the sense, once concluded and approved, the 
penalty can be reduced by one third. The deal between the prosecutor and the defendant must 
be submitted to the Court. The judge is not bound to this deal and after assessing the 
evidentiary support of the Plea Agreement, he/she can disapprove it, if the evidence shows the 
defendant’s guilt is not sufficiently proved, or in the case, if proved to be guilty, the proposed 
punishment for defendant is too lenient. If the defendant is deemed guilty and there is 
                                                          
12 At the moment of its adoption in 2004, the Article 495-7 of the French Criminal Procedure Code provided a 
limit of punishment of 5 years imprisonment for the crimes which could be a subject of plea agreement. The 
Article 495-7 has been amended on 13 December 2011 and the limit of punishment has been removed excepting 
the cases of intentional or unintentional, physical or sexual assault for which, some limits of punishments still 
remained.  
13 See, ‘Les chiffres clés de la Justice – 2012’, Ministère de la Justice,  Secrétariat general, Service support et 
moyens du ministère sous-direction de la Statistique et des Études 13, place Vendôme - 75 042 Paris Cedex 01, 
available on http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/chiffres_cles_2012_20121108.pdf 
14
 See, Borasi, Ivan, Il patteggiamento. Approcio di sistema alle implicazioni procesuali, Altalex Editore, Ebook 
format, chapters I-II 
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proportionality between the committed facts and the proposed punishment, the judge must 
approve the agreement. The Italian rules of criminal proceedings provide the possibility for 
this sentence of approval the plea agreement to be appealed before the Corte di Cassazione 
(Court of Cassation), the highest Italian court which rules only on assessing the legality of 
procedure and the interpretation of the law.   
Even though the Italian practitioners have much more expertise than other European 
colleagues in negotiating justice and even a reshaping of the relevant law provision according 
to the practice requirements, they still consider this procedure as very difficult to reconcile 
with the Italian traditional procedural institutions. A conclusive opinion on this matter is done 
by the Italian highest court, Corte di Cassazione in its sentence 15 Cassazione Penale (1990) 
47, in which, the negotiated admission of guilt was deemed as a ‘hypothetical judgment’15.  
3.3 Germany 
 The German approach to doing negotiated justice was the most original among the 
European Continental countries because, in spite of its obvious presence in the practice, there 
was no legal provision providing expressly a Plea Agreement procedure since May 2009 
when the German Federal Parliament adopted a new provision of the German Criminal 
Procedure Code, Section 257 c named Negotiated Agreement which explicitly acknowledged 
plea bargaining. Until then, the so called Absprachen (The Agreements) emerged in practice 
without statutory authorization and, paradoxically, not being bound by some legal limits of 
the penalties to the offenses on which the plea guilty was negotiated, such agreements could 
be encountered in many kinds of criminal cases, even in those involving serious crimes like 
drug trafficking and homicide. This is an aspect which demonstrates a less concern of the 
practitioners in harmonizing their work with the procedural principles but rather in achieving 
their main goals. Due to the fact that until the explicit adoption of plea agreement in the 
German Criminal Procedure Code a practice in this respect has been already outlined, the law 
provision did nothing more than to legislate something which became almost usual. In this 
respect, it worth mentioning some characteristics of the German Negotiated Agreement, as 
previewed in the Section 257 c: there is no provision limiting the application of plea 
agreement to only some kind of offenses or to the offenses with a specific limit of penalty 
previewed by the law; an in-court confession shall be an integral part of any negotiated 
agreement; the measures of reform and prevention, may not be the subject of negotiation; on 
free evaluation of all the circumstances of the case as well as general sentencing 
considerations, the court may indicate an upper or lower sentence limit and the agreement will 
come into existence only if both the prosecutor and the defendant agree with the sentence 
limit proposed by the court; if legal or factually significant circumstances have been 
overlooked in the agreement, the court is not bound of it and may enter a trial following the 
classic procedural rules and then the defendant’s confession may not be used, a fact the court 
shall notify to the parties.  
As a conclusion, we must remember the former German approach because of its 
originality and ingenuity to find a way of doing negotiated justice by interpreting the criminal 
procedure in the sense that something which is not expressly prohibited may be permitted as 
well as the current formula which does not limit its application only to some less serious 
crimes and which protects the defendant’s right of not self-incriminating, in the case the 
                                                          
15
 See, G. Lattanzi, E. Lupo, ‘Codice di Procedura Penale’, Vol. VI, Giuffré, Milano, 1997, p. 205-215. 
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agreement fails. However, due to the fact that Plea Agreement has some inaccuracies with the 
traditional principles of criminal procedures it is not very popular with the German 
specialists
16
.    
3.1. Poland 
 Since 1998, Poland has also had a kind of plea agreement
17
 which proved to be a very 
original one because according to the Article 387 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of Poland, the agreement is not concluded in the pre-trial phase of the process but during the 
hearings before the court. The plea agreement is applicable only to the misdemeanours 
punishable by no more than 8 years of imprisonment. The procedure allows the defendant, 
until the conclusion of the first examination at the first-instance hearing, to submit a motion 
for a decision convicting him and sentencing him to a specified penalty or penal measure 
without evidentiary proceedings. It is called also the procedure of ‘voluntary submission to a 
penalty’ and allows the court to pass the agreed sentence without reviewing the evidence. The 
proposed penalty will be accepted by the court and afterward enforced only if the prosecutor, 
the victim and the court, all of them, agree on it. Nevertheless, the court may not accept the 
terms of proposed plea agreement, in spite of the fact they were already agreed by the victim 
and the prosecutor and may suggest some changes. If the defendant agrees with the court 
requirements and submits a new penalty proposition accordingly, the court must approve it 
and render the sentence according to the plea agreement. Even if the Polish Plea Agreement 
supposes an all parties deal during the trial and apparently, there is no reason for appealing 
the sentence, all of them, the prosecutor, the defendant and the victim have, also, the right to 
appeal. We can mention, as a very interesting feature of this procedure, the key role that has 
been assigned to the victim because he/she appears as a veritable ‘auxiliary prosecutor’. Is 
well known the fact in Polish criminal proceedings the victim can ask and may act as an 
‘auxiliary prosecutor’ and therefore, among the other similar procedural rights, the victim 
gains also the right to appeal, exactly like the official prosecutor. Finally, if the Plea 
Agreement represents, among the others, a concession to the defendant in exchange for 
his/her conduct, in the sake of the fairness of the justice act, the increased role of the victim 
within the Plea Agreement procedure appears as being welcomed. 
3.5 Romania 
 The new Code of Criminal Procedure of Romania into force since February 1, 2014 
explicitly previews the procedure of plea agreement
18
. According to it, during the pre-trial 
phase of the criminal process, from the incentive of both the defendant and the prosecutor, 
can be concluded an agreement of defendant’s admission his/her guilt for the charges, or only 
for part of them, in exchange for a lenient punishment. In Romania, the bargain is not about 
the charges but only about the sentence that is, a reduced penalty or less coercive forms of 
                                                          
16
 See, B. Schüneman, ‘Wohin treibt der deutsche Strafprozess’ in Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 114 (2002), p. 570. Paradoxically, in spite of the fact the author Bernard Schüneman is 
one of the most bitter opponent of introducing plea agreement into the German legislation, he had to admit in his 
research that 91 per cent of the judges, 90 per cent of the prosecutors, and 53 per cent of the defence lawyers 
expressed a preference for informal agreements rather than trial in cases involving evidential difficulty. 
17
 See, the Criminal Procedure Code of Poland, Act of 6 June 1997, Article 387 para. 1-5, (English version)  
available on http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4172/file/Polish% 20CPC%201997am% 
202003 en.pdf 
18
 See, the new Criminal Procedure Code of Romania as adopted by the Law no.135/2010, published in the 
Official Monitor of Romania no. 486 of July 15, 2010 and modified by the Law no. 255/2013 published in the 
Official Monitor of Romania no. 515 of August 14, 2013, Articles 478-488. 
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penalty enforcement like, for example, the suspending of its enforcement. The written consent 
of the supervisory prosecutor is necessary as a precondition to conclude the plea agreement. 
According to the law provision, concluding such agreement is prohibited for the most serious 
crimes for which the criminal law previews a punishment of more than seven years 
imprisonment. In order of guaranteeing the legality and the interest of the defendant within 
negotiations, the law previews as a binding rule, the defendant to be assisted by an attorney. 
The plea agreement in its written form and accompanied by evidentiary support is submitted 
to the court of first instance. The judge, once receiving it, commences a public but non-
contradictory session in which invite the prosecutor, the defendant and his/her attorney to 
make opening speeches. After the hearings and examination of the evidentiary support of plea 
agreement, the court takes a decision which can be: a sentence of convicting the defendant to 
a punishment no more severe than that proposed in the agreement, if the legality of 
proceedings, the rights of defendant and the proportionality between the gravity of the facts 
and the severity of the penalty are provided; a disapproval of the plea agreement and the 
return of the criminal file to the Prosecutor’s Office if there is not enough evidentiary support 
for demonstrating the guilt of the defendant, the agreement overlooked some legal 
requirements or, the proposed penalty is too much lenient in comparison with the committed 
facts.  Whatever of the both above mentioned decisions of the court of first instance would be 
rendered, the defendant and the prosecutor can appeal it.  
In this moment is too early to assess the impact of Plea Agreement in the criminal 
jurisprudence of Romania but some remarks related only to its legal background can be done. 
It appears to be in the trend of European Continental model, applied only for some less severe 
crimes, with scarce bargaining tools for the prosecutor and involving an in-court confession of 
the defendant. 
 3.6 Estonia 
 Since 1 September 2011 when the amendments of the Criminal Procedure Code 
adopted on 23 February 2011 entered into force, Estonia has its own Plea Agreement19 which 
is actually called Alternative Proceedings (Articles 233- 238). It supposes a request of the 
defendant to the Prosecutor’s Office to follow this procedure, according to which the court 
may adjudicate a criminal matter by way of alternative proceedings on the basis of the 
materials of the criminal file without summoning the witnesses or other qualified persons. 
Alternative Proceedings is prohibited for the most serious crimes for which the punishment of 
life detention is previewed, as well as for the cases where several defendants are accused and 
at least one of them does not consent to the application of alternative proceedings. If the 
defendant and the prosecutor consent to the application of alternative proceedings, the 
Prosecutor's Office prepares the statement of charges which is going to be included in the 
criminal file and the file shall be sent to the court.  
Once the criminal file was received and the session was opened, the judge announces 
the commencement of examination by the court and makes a proposal to the prosecutor to 
make an opening speech. The prosecutor gives an overview of the charges and the evidence 
which corroborates the charges and which the prosecutor requests to be examined by the 
court. After assessing the legality of the proceedings, the judge shall ask whether the 
                                                          
19 See, the Criminal Procedure Code of Estonia, passed on 12.02.2003 published in the Riigi Teataja I 2003, 27, 
166 entered into force on 01.07.2004,  Articles 233- 238, (English version) available on http://legislationline 
.org/download/action/ download/id/4709/file /Estonia_CPC_am2013_en.pdf  
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defendant understands the charges, whether he/she confesses to the charges and whether 
he/she consents to the adjudication of the criminal matter by way of alternative proceedings. 
If all the necessary conditions are fulfilled, the judge commences the hearings and the 
participants in the court session shall rely only on the materials of the criminal file. If a 
judgment of conviction is made by way of alternative proceedings, the court shall reduce the 
principal punishment to be imposed on the accused by one-third after considering all the facts 
relating to the criminal offence. 
A short comment on this Estonian Alternative Proceedings is the fact that the 
bargaining tools of the prosecutor are very scarce. He/she cannot propose a kind or a limit of 
penalty as long as the law previews a reduction of one-third of the punishment and this is to 
the disposal of the judge. This procedure does not follow a pattern of Plea Agreement in its 
European Continental variant but rather it is a variant of the guilty plea proceedings which 
commences during the Pre-Trial phase of the process.   
3.7 Georgia 
 The Plea Agreement was introduced in Georgia in 2004 and despite its statute of ex-
soviet country, until then under a strong influence of the civil law system, basically the new 
adopted Georgian plea bargaining, in most respects, is inspired by the Anglo-American 
models
20
. It consists of an alternative and consensual way of criminal case settlement without 
an in-court confession of the defendant who agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a lesser 
charge or for a more lenient sentence or, according to the case, for dismissal of certain related 
charges (Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia). The Georgian procedure is 
based on the principle of the free choice of the defendant, equality of the parties and 
protection of his/her rights and safeguards. The defendant has the right to reject the plea 
agreement at any stage of the criminal proceedings before the court renders the judgment and 
the use in the future of the information provided by the defendant under the plea agreement 
against him is explicitly prohibited. In concluding the agreement, the prosecutor is obliged to 
take into consideration the public interest, the severity of the penalty, and the personal 
characteristics of the defendant and as a guarantee of these aspects, the procedure previews 
the consent of the supervisory prosecutor as necessary precondition to conclude plea 
agreement and to amend its provisions. The court is not bound by the agreement and if the 
presented evidence is not sufficient to support the charges or if other requirements stipulated 
by the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia are violated by the agreement, the judge can 
return the case to the prosecution, not before offering to the parties the possibility to change 
the terms of the agreement. If the court satisfies itself that the defendant fully acknowledges 
the consequences of the plea agreement, he/she was represented by the Defence council, 
his/her will is expressed in full compliance with the legislative requirements without 
deception and coercion, also if there is enough body of doubtless evidence for the conviction 
and the agreement is reached on legitimate sentence - the court approves the plea agreement 
and renders guilty judgment. If any of the abovementioned requirements are not satisfied, the 
court rejects to approve the plea agreement and returns the case to the prosecutor. Another 
important aspect which deserves to be mentioned is the position of the victim in relation to the 
plea agreement. Under Article 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, the prosecutor 
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is obliged to consult with the victim prior to concluding the plea agreement and to inform 
him/her about this and is, also, obliged to take into consideration the interests of the victim 
and as a binding rule, to conclude the plea agreement only after the damage is already 
compensated.  
As a conclusion, we can see a very unusual and courageous legislative action from the 
Georgian legislator when adopting this procedure in very relative terms with the 
Anglo/American Plea Agreement, in spite of the judicial tradition inspired by the civil law 
systems and the lack of adversarial expertise in the Georgian criminal jurisprudence.   
4. FINAL REMARKS 
Taken from the Common Law legal systems, the Plea Agreement procedure began to 
be implemented in the European continental judiciaries, especially in the last decade and it 
succeeded to be already a common practice within these countries. Even if the models 
adopted in these above mentioned judiciaries differ from those implemented in the Anglo-
American systems, that is, a weak implementation, only in minor criminal cases and not just 
to avoid the trial but actually to shorten it, most likely, in the future, after the assessment of its 
application in practice proves to be a positive one, for sure, this procedure will be expanded to 
the cases involving serious crimes and the limits of negotiating will be allowed to a wider 
range. So far, the issue of justice negotiation is inconsistent with certain traditional principles 
and institutions of the criminal proceedings in the civil law countries and is still hard to be 
accepted for some specialists. 
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